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i
QUESTION PRESENTED

Amici will address the following question:
Whether a conclusory allegation that a
cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official
knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a
plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts
purportedly committed by subordinate officials is
sufficient to state individual-capacity claims
against those officials under Bivens.
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INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
In the immediate aftermath of the September
11, 2001, attacks, Muslims and those perceived to be
Muslim were murdered, assaulted, harassed, and
subject to other discriminatory conduct. Amici are
organizations that have responded to such
discrimination on behalf of Muslims, Arabs, South
Asians, and Sikhs. Since 9/11, amici have led various
efforts to safeguard the rights of these communities
and to vindicate their rights when abridged.
In important respects, this case concerns the
“September 11, 2001 context.” Amici assert that a
meaningful appreciation of that context requires an
understanding of the extensive private and public
backlash against Muslims and others following 9/11.
Amici also contend that the post-9/11 climate itself
must be placed in the larger context of the
government’s ongoing struggle to balance security
and liberty in times of war. This case also implicates
the proper relationship between religious liberty and
government action, which must be taken into
account as well. Amici are concerned that, without a
broader factual and historical view of the case,
proper consideration may not be afforded to
Respondent
Javaid
Iqbal’s
allegations
of
mistreatment on the basis of his race and religion.

1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or
in part, and no such counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief. No person other than the amici curiae, or their
counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund its
preparation or submission. The parties have consented to the
filing of this brief and such consents are being lodged herewith.
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Amici, mindful of Supreme Court Rule 37.1,

submit that its unique interest in post-9/11
discrimination and relevant historical themes will
enrich the Court’s perspective on the disputed issues
and will thus aid in the Court’s decisional process.
*

*

*

The Sikh Coalition was founded on September
11, 2001, to 1) defend civil rights and liberties for all
people; 2) promote community empowerment and
civic engagement within the Sikh community; 3)
create an environment where Sikhs can lead a
dignified life unhindered by bias and discrimination;
and 4) educate the broader community about
Sikhism in order to promote cultural understanding
and create bridges across communities.
The
American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination
Committee (ADC) is a civil rights organization
committed to defending the rights of people of Arab
descent and promoting their rich cultural heritage.
ADC, which is non-sectarian and non-partisan, is the
largest Arab-American grassroots civil rights
organization in the United States. Founded in 1980
by former United States Senator James Abourezk,
ADC is at the forefront in addressing discrimination
and bias against Arab-Americans.
The Discrimination and National Security
Initiative (DNSI) is a non-profit organization
established in 2004. DNSI’s purpose is to research
the mistreatment of minority communities in times
of war and in particular to study the human
consequences of post-9/11 discrimination.
The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) is
a public service agency working for the civil rights of
American Muslims, for the integration of Islam into
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American pluralism, and for a positive, constructive
relationship between American Muslims and their
elected representatives. MPAC was created in 1988
to promote a vibrant American Muslim community
and to enrich American society through exemplifying
the Islamic values of Mercy, Justice, Peace, Human
Dignity, Freedom, and Equality for all.
South Asian Americans Leading Together
(SAALT) is a national, non-profit, non-partisan
organization dedicated to fostering civic and political
engagement by South Asians in the United States
through a social justice framework that includes
policy analysis and advocacy, community education,
and leadership development.
The Sikh American Legal Defense and
Education Fund (SALDEF) is the oldest and largest
Sikh American civil rights and advocacy organization
in the United States. SALDEF’s mission is to protect
the civil rights of Sikh Americans through legal
assistance,
legislative
advocacy,
educational
outreach, and media advocacy.
The Sikh Council on Religion and Education is
a faith-based non-profit organization dedicated to
creating awareness of the Sikh religion and the Sikh
people in the United States and around the world,
and to promoting the values of justice, equality and
brotherhood inherent in the Sikh religion. It aims to
provide a platform for interfaith dialogue to create a
peaceful coexistence of all faiths.
United Sikhs is a UN-DPI-affiliated,
international non-profit, non-governmental, humanitarian relief, human and civil rights advocacy
organization, aimed at empowering those in need,
especially disadvantaged and minority communities
across the world.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
On September 11, 2001, nineteen
Muslim men, aged 20-38, used hijacked commercial
airplanes to attack the World Trade Center in New
York and the Pentagon in Virginia. “Americans will
never forget the devastation wrought by these acts.”
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006). One
subset of individuals in America – those sharing
characteristics with those responsible for 9/11 – were
subject to an immediate and widespread backlash
initiated by private and public actors.
An aspect of the public response to the attacks
was the government’s mass preventative detention of
over one thousand individuals. The Department of
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, reviewed the
cases of 762 of the “September 11 detainees.” See
Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the
Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in
Connection with the Investigation of the September
11 Attacks (Apr. 2003) (OIG Report). The report
found that the detainees were “almost exclusively
men,” most were between 26 and 40 years of age, and
most were of Pakistani origin. Id. at 20-21. The
report determined that, in New York, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) “made little effort”
to differentiate between those detainees tied to
terrorism and those encountered by chance. See id.
at 69.
Similarly, it noted that the process of
ascertaining which detainees were persons of “high
interest” was both inconsistent and imprecise. See
id. at 158. The report noted that the September 11
detainees’ conditions of confinement in the
Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) raise “serious
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questions” regarding the treatment of those
detainees. Id.
2.
On November 2, 2001, Respondent
Javaid Iqbal – a Muslim male, and native and citizen
of Pakistan – was arrested in New York by FBI and
INS agents. See Compl. at¶80. He was arrested on
charges related to identity theft. See Elmaghraby v.
Ashcroft, No. 04-1409, 2005 WL 2375202, at *1 n.1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005) (Respondent Iqbal was
charged with violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 & 1028
(conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud
with identification)). He pleaded guilty.
Respondent Iqbal alleges that, on or around
November 5, 2001, he was brought to the MDC in
Brooklyn and housed in its general population unit.
See Compl. at¶81. He further alleges that he was
subsequently designated to be a person of “high
interest” and, as a result, on or around January 8,
2002, was housed in MDC’s Administrative
Maximum (“ADMAX”) Special Housing Unit (“SHU”)
– a unit created after 9/11 to hold post-September 11
detainees. See id. at¶¶51, 81. Respondent Iqbal
contends that ADMAX SHU detainees were subject
“to highly restrictive conditions of confinement” that
were “[m]arkedly different from the conditions in the
MDC’s general population[.]” Id. at ¶¶60, 63.
3.
Respondent Iqbal filed suit against
Petitioners and others,2 generally challenging his

2
The remaining defendants are: Michael Rolince,
Former Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations
Section, Counterterrorism Division; Kenneth Maxwell, Former
Assistant Special Agent in Charge, New York Field Office, FBI;
Kathleen Hawk Sawyer, former Director of the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP); David Rardin, Former Director of the Northeast
Region of the BOP; Michael Cooksey, Former Assistant Director
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classification as a person of “high interest” and the
permissibility of the harsher conditions of
confinement he experienced as a result. See id. at
¶¶1-2.3
Respondent Iqbal argues that he was
designated to be a person of “high interest” and
thereafter sent to the ADMAX SHU solely because of
his race, religion, and national origin – not because
of any tie to terrorism or for any other legitimate
penological purpose. See id. at ¶¶3, 52, 96.
The
complaint
presses
twenty-one
constitutional and statutory claims.
In relevant
part, the complaint asserts, pursuant to Bivens,4
that Petitioners violated the First Amendment by
subjecting Respondent Iqbal to harsher conditions of
confinement because of his religious beliefs (claim
11), and the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment by subjecting him to harsher conditions
of confinement because of his race (claim 12). See
Compl. at ¶¶204-206, 231-36.5
4.
Prior to discovery, Petitioners and other
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint,
contending that qualified immunity shielded them
from liability and specifically that the allegations in
the complaint were insufficient to overcome the
qualified immunity defense. See Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (under Rule 8(a)(2) of the
for Correctional Programs of the BOP; former and current
Wardens of the MDC; and certain MDC officers and personnel.
3 Respondent Iqbal filed suit with Ehad Elmaghraby, a
Muslim male. The United States settled Elmaghraby’s claims
for $300,000. Therefore, Respondent Iqbal remains the only
plaintiff in this action.
4
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
5

In consideration of Supreme Court Rule 37.1 and

amici’s statement of interest, this brief will focus on these
claims of discrimination.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” such
that the defendant has “fair notice of what the
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.”). The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of New York noted that dismissal of a
complaint is appropriate under Rule 8(a) if, taking
the factual allegations as true, it is clear that no set
of facts would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See
Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *9. Applying this
standard, the district court denied the motion as to
the Bivens claims against Petitioners. See id. at *35.
The district court observed that “our nation’s
unique and complex law enforcement and security
challenges in the wake of the September 11, 2001
attacks do not warrant the elimination of remedies
for the constitutional violations alleged here.” Id.;
see id. at *18 (“the proposition . . . that, as a matter
of law, constitutional and statutory rights must be
suspended during times of crisis, is supported
neither by statute nor the Constitution.”). The court
further stated that while context is relevant to a
qualified immunity determination, “the qualified
immunity standard will not allow the Attorney
General to carry out his national security functions
wholly free from concern for his personal liability[.]”
Id. at *14. And, while the Attorney General “may on
occasion have to pause to consider whether a
proposed course of action can be squared with the
Constitution,” he “should be made to hesitate[.]” Id.
(emphasis in original; quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982)).
In addition, the district court stated that “the
post-September 11 context provides support for
plaintiffs’ assertions that defendants were involved
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in creating and/or implementing the detention policy
under which plaintiffs were confined[.]” Id. at *20.
According to the district court, the OIG Report
“suggests the involvement of [Petitioners] in creating
or implementing a policy under which plaintiffs were
confined in restrictive conditions until cleared by the
FBI from involvement in terrorist activities.” Id. at
*20 n.20 (citing OIG Report at 37-38, 39, 42, 49, 60
112-13, 116).
5.
Petitioners and others filed an
interlocutory appeal, objecting to the district court’s
ruling on the motion to dismiss. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that a Supreme
Court opinion issued after the district court’s
decision, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct.
1955 (2007), generated uncertainty regarding the
pleading standard applicable under Rule 8(a). See
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 155 (2nd Cir. 2007).
According to the Second Circuit, Twombly did not
institute a heightened pleading standard, but rather
clarified the meaning of the pleading requirements –
dispensing with the “no set of facts” rubric, a pleader
is instead obligated “to amplify a claim with some
factual allegations in those contexts where such
amplification is needed to render the claim
plausible.” Id. at 157-58 (emphasis in original).
With
this
understanding
of
the
pleading
requirements and upon accepting the allegations in
the complaint as true for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, the Second Circuit affirmed, except with
respect to a procedural due process claim.
The Second Circuit remarked that the
defendants’ arguments regarding qualified immunity
were permeated by the contention that “the
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack created a
context in which the defense must be assessed
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differently and, from their standpoint, favorably.”
Id. at 151. The circuit court maintained, however,
that “most of the rights that the Plaintiff contends
were violated do not vary with surrounding
circumstances” and that “[t]he strength of our
system of constitutional rights derives from the
steadfast protection of those rights in both normal
and unusual times.” Id. at 159. Indeed, the right
“not to be subjected to ethnic or religious
discrimination [was] clearly established prior to 9/11,
and . . . remain[s] clearly established even in the
aftermath of that horrific event.” Id. at 160.
Moreover, the Second Circuit held that “it is
plausible” to believe that Petitioners “would be
aware of policies concerning the detention of those
arrested by federal officers in the New York City
area in the aftermath of 9/11 and would know about,
condone, or otherwise have personal involvement in
the implementation of those policies.” Id. at 166. As
to the claims of discrimination, the Second Circuit
noted that the “allegation that [Petitioners] condoned
and agreed to the discrimination . . . satisfies the
plausibility standard” of Rule 8(a) “because of the
likelihood that these senior officials would have
concerned themselves with the formulation and
implementation of policies dealing with the
confinement of those arrested on federal charges in
the New York City area and designated ‘of high
interest’ in the aftermath of 9/11.” Id. at 175-76.
Judge Cabranes filed a concurring opinion in
which he expressed fear that this case would lead to
more suits from those aggrieved by national security
programs and doubted whether district judges could
manage discovery in such cases. Id. at 179.
6.
On June 16, 2008, this Court granted
certiorari.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent Javaid Iqbal – a Muslim male,
arrested in New York after the attacks of September
11, 2001 – alleges that he was subjected to harsher
conditions of confinement solely because of his race,
religion, and national origin. Amici contend that this
case cannot be examined in isolation or only against
the backdrop of the attacks. Context matters, and in
this case that context is multi-faceted. In particular,
this case implicates the Nation’s historical tradition
of respecting an individual’s religious beliefs or
affiliation, the historical use of personal characteristics as a proxy for suspicion in times of war, and
the Nation’s overall treatment of Muslims and those
perceived to be Muslim in the aftermath of 9/11.
Amici assert that an appreciation for these
broader historical and factual perspectives is
required in order for proper consideration to be given
to the allegations and legal conclusions under
review. Amici argue that these perspectives support
the Second Circuit’s ruling with respect to
Respondent Iqbal’s claims of discrimination.
A.
The Framers, fresh from their
experience with religious persecution, espoused the
view that the individual conscience and its religious
elements were beyond the reach of the government.
At the same time, they recognized that an
individual’s actions, even if they were consistent
with an individual’s religious views, were amenable
to government regulation. According to the Framers,
the courts were to serve as an independent check on
state action that allegedly interfered with an
individual’s religious liberty. This judicial function
is enhanced in times of war.

11
In light of these guiding principles,
Respondent Iqbal may not be punished – placed in a
prison environment containing harsher conditions of
confinement – because of his religious beliefs or
affiliation alone. His conduct, committing identify
theft, is not in any way related to the terrorist
attacks or to the specter of future acts of terrorism,
and no evidence has been presented to the contrary.
Therefore, it does not seem that his actions were the
justification for his classification as a person of “high
interest” or for his placement into a prison unit
specifically created for “September 11 detainees.”
Amici are concerned that Respondent Iqbal’s
Muslim faith was the sole reason for his segregation
from the general prison population and subsequent
placement into harsher conditions of confinement.
This concern is wholly consistent with the OIG
Report, which: found that the FBI and INS agents
made little attempt to distinguish between those
detainees that presented a security risk and those
that happened to be encountered coincidentally;
questioned the criteria used to designate a detainee a
person of “high interest;” and determined that the
process used for such classifications was inconsistent
and imprecise. See OIG Report, at 20, 69, 158, 196.
Amici therefore argue that the district court
should be permitted to perform its essential role of
reviewing whether Respondent Iqbal was punished
by the government because of his Muslim faith.
B.
If Respondent Iqbal was segregated and
placed into a harsher prison unit solely because of
his religion, the question becomes whether national
security interests sanitize such government action.
Amici assert that the Nation’s history reveals that
this action is clearly impermissible even in wartime.
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During World War II, the government
interned over 100,000 individuals of Japanese
descent in America. The Court, deferring to the
government’s claims of military necessity and in
recognition of the fact that the Nation was in conflict
with the Japanese Empire, upheld the executive
order giving rise to the internment. See Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justice Robert
H. Jackson dissented, arguing that the Court had
validated a principle of racial discrimination that
“lies about like a loaded weapon” available to any
authority claiming that national security demands
urgent discriminatory action. Id. at 246.
It is that same loaded weapon that the
government has attempted to wield in this case.
Just as the government after Pearl Harbor used
Japanese ancestry as a proxy for suspicion or
disloyalty, amici are concerned that the government
after 9/11 has used the Muslim religion as a proxy
for those same unsavory qualities – a technique that
is clearly wrong in light of Justice Jackson’s opinion.
Accordingly, amici disagree with Petitioners that it
was “sensible” to treat individuals who shared the
hijackers’ religion in this fashion. For the same
reason, amici disagree with Petitioners’ assertion
that Respondent Iqbal’s allegation that he was
classified as a security risk solely because of his
religion is insufficient to state a claim.
Justice
Jackson
also
expressed
his
disappointment that the Court was used as an
instrument to bring a discriminatory wartime
doctrine within the bounds of the Constitution.
Petitioners are asking the Court to believe that the
“September
11
context”
excuses
wholesale
discrimination and thereby insulates them from
allegations of discriminatory treatment.
The
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Constitution should not be read to encompass this
proposition.
Amici argue that that national security
interests do not justify the blanket placement of
Muslim detainees into harsher conditions of
confinement.
C.
Petitioners contend that even if
discriminatory conduct took place with respect to
Respondent Iqbal and Muslims in the ADMAX SHU,
they did not have personal knowledge of such
conduct.
The extensive public backlash against
Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim, however,
belies any suggestion that Petitioners were unaware
of the mistreatment of Muslims, including
Respondent Iqbal, in the ADMAX SHU.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the government
engaged in a number of investigative and security
measures that targeted individuals on the basis of
their race, religion, and/or national origin. For
example,
Muslims
and
others
encountered
heightened airport screening, were prohibited from
boarding their flights, and were ejected from planes
because of how they looked. The government also
initiated several wide-ranging immigration programs
that rounded up thousands of Muslims in the hopes
that terrorists would be among those caught in the
government’s wide-net. In addition, the government
led a campaign of mass preventative detention, in
which over one thousand individuals were detained.
Respondent Iqbal’s allegations that he was
segregated from the general prison population and
assigned to the ADMAX SHU as a result of his race,
religion, or national origin are consistent with the
government’s other post-9/11 security responses,
which targeted Muslims irrespective of whether they
were linked to terrorism. It also supports the Second
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Circuit’s conclusions that it is plausible that
Petitioners affirmatively approved, condoned, or
knew of, the detention of Muslims, including
Respondent Iqbal, in a prison unit created
specifically after 9/11. The notion that Respondent
Iqbal was targeted as a result of his race, religion, or
national origin is supported by the OIG Report,
which commented on the arbitrary manner in which
individuals were detained and then selected by
federal agents for inclusion in the ADMAX SHU.
Amici argue that the post-9/11 backlash, taken
as a whole, suggests that Petitioners had personal
knowledge of the treatment of the September 11
detainees in the ADMAX SHU.
In conclusion, amici respectfully submit that
the Court of Appeals’ ruling with respect to
Respondent Iqbal’s claims of discrimination should
be affirmed.
ARGUMENT
BROADER HISTORICAL AND FACTUAL
CONTEXTS SUPPORT AFFIRMANCE OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS’ RULING
This case concerns whether Petitioners may be
held personally responsible, under Bivens, for
segregating Respondent Iqbal – a Muslim male
arrested in New York in the wake of 9/11 – and
subjecting him to harsher conditions of confinement
because of his race, religion, or national origin. This
case therefore implicates the Nation’s historical
tradition of safeguarding religious liberty, the
historical use of personal characteristics as a proxy
for suspicion in times of war, and the Nation’s overall
treatment of Muslims and those perceived to be
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Muslim in the aftermath of 9/11.
Amici contend
that this case cannot be viewed on its own or only in
the post-9/11 context – it is another episode in the
Nation’s ongoing and maturing endeavor to provide
security while safeguarding liberty. In this sense,
amici argue that broader historical and factual
contexts are required to properly examine the
allegations and legal conclusions now under review.
As explained below, a more comprehensive
perspective of the case cuts in favor of affirming the
Second Circuit’s opinion with respect to Respondent’s
claims of discrimination.
A.

The Historical Importance of Religious
Liberty in the United States Highlights
the Need for Judicial Review

A foundation of the American Republic is that
the individual may freely practice his religion
without government interference. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per curiam)
(“religious worship both in method and belief must
be
strictly
protected
from
government
intervention.”); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of

the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1830 (2004)

(describing the American concept of religious liberty
as a “negative liberty,” that is “a sphere of private
activity to be protected from state interference[.]”).
This fundamental view regarding the appropriate
relationship between the individual and the State
was enshrined in the First Amendment, which
provides that, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST.,
AMDT. 1.
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The Framers found it necessary to include this
provision in the Constitution because of their
experiences with religious persecution. See Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (it was “historical
instances of religious persecution and intolerance
that gave concern to those who drafted the Free
Exercise Clause.”); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S.
157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result)
(“the First Amendment separately mention[s] free
exercise of religion” because of “[t]he history of
religious persecution[.]”). Accordingly, the Framers
placed the individual conscience, including its
religious dimensions if any, beyond the reach of
government control or coercion. See Abington Sch.
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (“The
place of religion in our society is an exalted one,
achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the .
. . inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind.
We have come to recognize through bitter experience
that it is not within the power of the government to
invade that citadel[.]”); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S.
17, 25 (1968) (noting that the First Amendment
“creates a preserve where the views of the individual
are made inviolate.”).
As a result, the government generally cannot
penalize (or reward) individuals on the basis of
religious belief or affiliation alone. See Everson v.
Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Tp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap
religions, than it is to favor them.”). Instead, the
Framers contended that it is only the individual’s
conduct – not the religious content of his mind – that
the government may touch. See Schneider, 390 U.S.
at 25 (quoting Thomas Jefferson as saying, “[t]he
opinions of men are not the object of civil
government, nor under its jurisdiction[.] [I]t is time
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enough for the rightful purposes of civil government
for its officers to interfere when principles break out
into overt acts against peace and good order[.]”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802),
reprinted in Michael W. McConnell, et al., Religion
and the Constitution, 54-55 (2002) (“religion is a
matter which lies solely between man and his God,
that he owes account to none other for his faith or his
worship, that the legislative powers of government
reach actions only, and not opinions[.]”). In short,
the freedom of religion, however revered in our
constitutional tradition, is not absolute – while
“legislative power over mere opinion is forbidden,”
such power “may reach people’s actions when they
are found to be in violation of important social duties
or subversive of good order” even if the actions are
consistent with the people’s religious convictions.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
The Framers also recognized that the courts
were to serve as a check on government activity
implicating religious liberty. See Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979) (quoting James Madison
as saying, “independent tribunals of justice will
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of [the Bill of Rights]; they will be an
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by
the declaration of rights.”) (citation omitted);
McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844,
883 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Our Founders
conceived of a Republic receptive to voluntary
religious expression, and provided for the possibility

18
of judicial intervention when government action
threatens or impedes such expression.”); Michael W.
The
Origins
and
Historical
McConnell,
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1445 n.186 (1990) (noting, with
respect to the free exercise clause, that, “[t]he
evidence is overwhelming that [the] framers and
ratifiers understood and intended the courts to
engage in constitutional judicial review.”). This is
See National
especially so in times of war.
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 394 (2004) (a
“shift of power and authority to the government
[after 9/11] calls for an enhanced system of checks
and balances to protect the precious liberties that are
vital to our way of life.”) (emphasis added).
In consideration of these guiding principles,
amici argue that Respondent Iqbal may not be
punished – classified as a person of “high interest”
and thereafter subjected to harsher conditions of
confinement – on the basis of his subscription to a
certain religious belief system, or the perception that
he did so subscribe. Further, while other individuals
invoked Islam to justify their socially-disruptive
behavior, Respondent’s actions – committing identity
theft – were wholly unrelated to 9/11 or any
religious-based conduct that upset the social order.6
6
Absent from Petitioners’ opening brief is any
indication that Respondent’s conduct was in any way related to
9/11 or the preparation of an additional attack.
Amici
anticipate that Petitioners may, in their reply brief, attempt to
make such a connection that is based on Respondent’s actions
rather than his membership to a particular faith. Any attempts
made for the first time in Petitioners’ reply should be viewed
with skepticism if not ignored entirely. See Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 895 (1988)
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Amici are concerned that it was Respondent’s faith

alone that served as the basis for his classification
and subsequent detention in the ADMAX SHU.
This concern is wholly consistent with the
OIG’s findings, which suggest that Muslims in New
York, such as Respondent Iqbal, were not only swept
up by federal authorities, but then categorically sent
to the ADMAX SHU irrespective of any link to
terrorism. See OIG Report, at 69 (the FBI and INS
“made little attempt” to distinguish between
detainees linked to the attacks or to terrorism, and
“those encountered coincidentally.”); id. at 158 (“we
question the criteria (or lack thereof) the FBI used to
make its initial designation of the potential danger
posed by September 11 detainees.”); id. (“there was
little consistency or precision to the process that
resulted in detainees being labeled ‘high interest,’ ‘of
interest,’ or ‘of undetermined interest.’”); id. at 196
(“we believe the FBI should have exercised more care
in the classification process[.]”); id. at 20 (an
Assistant U.S. Attorney from the Southern District
of New York “who worked on the terrorism
investigation” recalled that he was “frustrated that
the BOP did not distinguish between detainees who,
in his view, posed a security risk” and those who
were “uninvolved witnesses.”).
Amici respectfully urge the Court to allow the
district court to perform its essential role of
reviewing whether Respondent Iqbal was punished
on the basis of his religion.

(“argument[s] not presented to the courts below . . . will not be
considered here.”).
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B.

The Nation’s Historical Struggles with
Liberty and Security Suggest that the
Government’s Actions are Legally
Problematic

If Respondent’s classification and assignment
to the ADMAX SHU were premised not on his
actions, but instead on his actual or perceived
adherence to a certain belief system, the question
becomes whether the government may, on the basis
of a religion alone, segregate detainees and place
them into harsher conditions of confinement for
national security purposes.7 Amici contend that the
answer is plain that the government cannot. The
Nation’s past experiences with the wartime
treatment of individuals sharing characteristics with
the true enemy help reveal that answer.
During World War II, over 100,000 individuals
of Japanese descent in the West Coast of the United
States were brought from their homes to internment
camps. In Korematsu, the Court deferred to the
government’s arguments regarding the military
necessity of the relocation and upheld the
constitutionality of the executive order giving rise to
the internment. The Court noted that the petitioner
was interned not because of any racial animus
towards the Japanese, but

7
It appears that the government’s identification of
Respondent’s religion accounted for his classification and
detention in the ADMAX SHU. If, however, the reason for the
segregation was the safety of the Muslim detainees, or some
related penalogical purpose, this would not explain why the
ADMAX SHU would contain harsher conditions than the
general population. See Compl. at ¶¶61, 63.
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because we are at war with the
Japanese Empire, because the properly
constituted military authorities feared
an invasion of our West Coast and felt
constrained to take proper security
measures, because they decided that the
military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese
ancestry be segregated from the West
Coast temporarily[.]

Id. at 223.8 In dissent, Justice Jackson forewarned

that the majority had validated a principle of racial
discrimination that
lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an
urgent need. Every repetition imbeds
that principle more deeply in our law
and thinking and expands it to new
purposes. All who observe the work of
courts are familiar with what Judge
Cardozo described as “the tendency of a
principle to expand itself to the limit of
its logic.” [I]f [the courts] review and
approve, that passing incident becomes
the doctrine of the Constitution. There
8
Similarly, in upholding an American citizen of
Japanese ancestry’s conviction for violating the exclusion order
and curfew requirements imposed after the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the Court observed, “[w]e cannot close our eyes to the
fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of war residents
having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a
greater source of danger than those of a different ancestry.”
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943).
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it has a generative power of its own, and
all that it creates will be in its own
image.

Id. at 246 (footnote omitted). It is that same loaded

weapon that the government has attempted to wield
in the post-9/11 context and in this case specifically.
See Elbert Lin, Korematsu Continued . . . , 112 YALE
L.J. 1911, 1913-17 (2003) (suggesting that
Korematsu has been “revived” after 9/11, even
though features of 9/11 do not duplicate each aspect
of the internment); see also Eric Muller, 12/7 and
9/11: War, Liberties, and the Lessons of History, 104
W. VA. L. REV. 571, 592 (2002) (“Justice Jackson’s
instruction from sixty years ago must guide our steps
today.”). The government may not have exhibited
overt racial hostility towards Islam or Muslims. But
it has invoked national security to justify the
segregation and harsher treatment of Muslims
detained in the New York area despite the absence of
any evidence that Respondent Iqbal, a Muslim, was
disloyal to the United States. Justice Jackson was
troubled by the use of race as a proxy for disloyalty
in times of national emergency – amici possess the
identical concern in this case.
As a result, amici disagree with Petitioners
that, because “[t]he 19 hijackers were from Arab
nations and believed to be Islamic fundamentalists,”
it was “sensible” for the government to focus on
individuals with “the same radical ideology as the
attackers[.]” Pet. Br. at 34.9 For the same reason,
9
Even so, Islam cannot be equated with the “same
radical ideology” advanced by perpetrators of the attacks. See
generally “Islam is Peace” Says President, Remarks by the
President at Islamic Center of Washington, D.C., Sept. 17,
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amici dispute Petitioners’ argument that “the bare

allegation that those deemed to be ‘of high interest’
to the September 11 investigation were Arab or
Muslim men is insufficient on its own to suggest
illegal conduct.” Id. at 35. The reprehensibility of
Korematsu itself indicates that the government’s
segregation of Muslim men into a harsher penal
environment, without any evidence of disloyalty, is
imprudent, impermissible, and a clearly established
wrong. 10
Justice Jackson was also uncomfortable with
the use of the courts as an instrument to validate the
government’s discriminatory wartime actions. In
reflecting on Korematsu, he wrote that the executive
order under consideration “was an unconstitutional
one which the Court should not bring within the
Constitution by any doctrine of necessity, a doctrine
too useful as a precedent.” Robert H. Jackson,
Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L.
REV. 103, 116 (1951). Here, Petitioners have asked
the Court to believe that national security interests
justify the gathering of Muslim men from the general
prison population and their placement into harsher
conditions of confinement irrespective of their
actions or allegiance to the Nation.11 The Court
2001, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010917-11.html.
10 For example, in the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50
U.S.C. § 1989, et seq., “Congress recognize[d] that . . . a grave
injustice was done to both citizens and permanent residents of
Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of civilians during World War II” and that these
actions “were motivated largely by racial prejudice, wartime
hysteria, and a failure of political leadership.”
11 It cannot be argued that, by breaking the law with
respect to identity theft, that Respondent Iqbal has thereby
demonstrated his disloyalty. There is a difference between
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should not accept Petitioners’ invitation to conform
the Constitution to encompass this contention or to
convert wholesale religious discrimination into a
legitimate investigative technique or preventative
measure.12 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty[.]”).
Amici appreciate the difficult circumstances
that the Nation found itself in following the terrorist
attacks and the awesome responsibility that the
American law enforcement community assumed in
its aftermath. Those circumstances, however, do not
justify constitutional violations. See OIG Report at
164 (“While the chaotic situation and the
uncertainties surrounding the detainees’ role in the
September 11 attacks and the potential for
additional terrorism explain some of [the identified]
problems, they do not explain or justify all of them.”).
Amici are therefore mindful of Justice Jackson’s
warning that the courts should not be tempted to
excessively defer to the banner of national security.
See Jackson, 1 BUFF. L. REV. at 116 (“It is easy, by
giving way to the passion, intolerance and suspicions
of wartime, to reduce our liberties to a shadow, often
engaging in some behavior that falls outside of the limits of the
law and intending to engage in specific behavior of a treasonous
or terrorist sort.
12 Amici agree with Petitioners that the government’s
conduct should not be viewed “with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Pet. Br. at 34 n.5 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). But in light of the lessons of Korematsu,
amici contend that 20/20 hindsight is not required to ascertain
the wrongfulness of segregating detainees on the basis of
religion for harsher treatment – the impermissibility of such
segregation was apparent at the time of the government’s
conduct.
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in answer to exaggerated claims of security.”).
Accordingly, amici urge the Court to reject the
argument that the national security interests in this
case justify the blanket placement of Muslim
detainees into harsher conditions of confinement.
See 9/11 Commission Report, at p. 395 (“Our history
has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet,
if our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that
we are struggling to defend.”).
C.

The Extent of the Post-9/11 Backlash
Belies Petitioners’ Alleged Lack of
Personal Knowledge of the Detainees’
Classification or Treatment

Within minutes of the 9/11 attacks, Muslims
and those perceived to be Muslim in the United
States were targeted on the basis of their
appearance.13 Within one week, over six-hundred
hate crimes were directed against Muslims, Arabs,
South Asians, and Sikhs. See South Asian American
Leaders of Tomorrow, American Backlash: Terrorists
Bring War Home in More Ways Than One, 3 (2001),
available at: http://www.saalt.org/attachments/1/
American%20Backlash%20report.pdf. Within eight
weeks, nineteen individuals from these groups had
been murdered, while hundreds of others had been
stabbed, assaulted, harassed, terminated from their
employment, or denied access to restaurants and
similar locations – all in response to 9/11. See, e.g.,
13 For example, on 9/11, after the second plane hit the
World Trade Center, a Sikh was chased in lower Manhattan by
three men and ultimately took his turban off in order to avoid
further harassment. See Somini Sengupta, Arabs and Muslims
Steer Through an Unsettling Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2001.
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Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: PostSeptember 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion,
92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1265-77 (2004). According to
one report, “anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United
States rose 1700% during 2001.” Human Rights
Watch, ‘We Are Not the Enemy’: Hate Crimes
Against Arabs, Muslims, and Those Perceived to be
Arab or Muslim After September 11, Nov. 14, 2002,
available
at:
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/11/
usahate.htm. This invidious behavior has persisted
– over seven years after the attacks, members of
these
communities
continue
to
encounter
discriminatory conduct in various settings, including
schools and places of public accommodation. See,
e.g., Neha Singh Gohil & Dawinder S. Sidhu, The

Sikh Turban: Post-9/11 Challenges to this Article of
Faith, 9 Rutgers J. L. & Religion 10, 28-47 (2008).14

14 Petitioners accurately note that one of the purposes
of the qualified immunity doctrine is to reduce the possibility
that public officials will have to answer personally for wrongful
conduct and thereby incentivize the country’s best and brightest
to serve in the government. See Pet. Br. at 16. On the other
side of the ledger, however, we also must consider that the
failure to vigorously protect the rights of immigrants and
individuals in the United States who have certain
characteristics will also limit the best and the brightest of the
world from taking part in the American dream and contributing
to our society. For example, Balbir Singh Sodhi came to the
United States to escape religious persecution in India, see Mike
Anton, Collateral Damage in War on Terrorism, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2001, at A-26, only to be murdered in Mesa, Arizona
on September 15, 2001, “for no other reason than because he
was dark-skinned, bearded, and wore a turban,” Trial Begins
for Man Charged with Killing Sikh Immigrant, CNN, Aug. 18,
2003. It is less likely that immigrants would come to or stay in
this Nation if they are subject to discriminatory conduct,
particularly if that conduct is sanctioned by the courts. See PBS
Foreign Exchange, Jan. 14, 2006 (discussing “educated and
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At the same time, the government engaged in
investigative and security measures after 9/11 that
focused on race, religion, and national origin. For
example, in the airport setting, Muslims, Arabs,
South Asians, and Sikhs were subjected to
heightened screening, prohibited from boarding their
flights, and even ejected from planes on account of
their appearance or perceived religion. The number
of such post-9/11 incidents has been reported to be in
the dozens, with one 2002 count reaching 191
incidents. See Ahmad, 92 CAL. L. REV. at 1269; Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
Rev. 1575, 1576 n.1 (2002) (citation omitted).
The government also implemented several
immigration programs in order to round up Muslims
with the hope that terrorists would be among those
collected in the government’s wide-net. See Adam B.
Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 (2007)
(“In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, federal
officials conducted sweeps in which they rounded up
over a thousand noncitizens” where “[n]early all of
these noncitizens were from predominantly Muslim
countries.”). For example, the government’s special
registration program required aliens from countries,
almost all of which are predominantly Muslim, to
report to the INS to be fingerprinted and
See
photographed, and possibly interrogated.
Registration
and
Monitoring
of
Certain
Nonimmigrants From Designated Countries, 67 FED.
REG. 57,032 (Sept. 6, 2002).
In addition, the
skilled immigrants” leaving the United States, a trend known
as “reverse brain drain” or “flight capital,” which came to a
head after 9/11 when America “started to impose very heavy
and ham-fisted immigration policies on both newcomers and
potential arrivals.”).
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Absconder Apprehensive Initiative aimed to “locate,
apprehend, interview, and deport” approximately
“several thousand” individuals from countries where
there was an “al Qaeda terrorist presence or
activity,” again predominantly Muslim countries.
See Memorandum, the Deputy Attorney General,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Guidance for Absconder
Apprehension Initiative (Jan. 25, 2002). Also, under
Operation Liberty Shield, asylum seekers “from
nations where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda sympathizers, and
other terrorist groups are known to have operated”
would be detained for the duration of their asylum
proceedings. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland
Security, Operation Liberty Shield (Mar. 17, 2003),
available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/
press_release_0115.shtm. Pursuant to a separate
interview program, eight thousand Arab, Muslim,
and South Asian men were called in for “voluntary”
questioning. See Ahmad, 92 Cal. L. Rev. at 1271.
The impact of these policies on those from
predominantly Muslim countries is clear. For
example, “[b]etween September 2001 and September
2002, the number of deportable Pakistanis
apprehended increased 228%” and the number of
Pakistanis deported rose 129%. Id. at 1269.
Moreover, “a feature of the government’s
response to the attacks of September 11 has been its
campaign of mass preventive detention,” in which
1,147 individuals were detained by early November
2001. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV.
Under this feature, the
953, 960 (2002).15
15 Ostensibly because of the large number of detainees,
Petitioners and Judge Cabranes appear to be concerned that
this suit will lead to abuse by eager litigants and will thus
burden Petitioners.
Amici contend that this concern is
speculative – Petitioners have not shown that, in the seven
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government held individuals until it was determined
that they did not pose a security threat. See OIG
Report at 39 (quoting then-Assistant Attorney
General Michael Chertoff as saying, “we have to hold
these people until we find out what is going on.”).
Respondent Iqbal was arrested as a result of identity
theft charges, not an immigration sweep. But he was
in the system nonetheless and, because he was a
Muslim and thus presumptively dangerous, he was
part of the government’s campaign of mass
detention. See OIG Report at 20-21, 69, 158, 196
(suggesting that persons, mainly from Muslim and
Arab countries, were detained and classified as
persons of “high interest” arbitrarily and without
evidence of terrorism).
Here, the nature of the government’s overall
security approach to the 9/11 attacks – which
appears to have focused on race, religion, and
national origin rather than an individual’s actual
link to terrorism – is consistent with Respondent
Iqbal’s claim that “within the New York area, all
Arab Muslim men arrested on criminal or
immigration charges while the FBI was following an
investigative lead into the September 11th attacks –
however unrelated the arrestee was to the
investigation – were immediately classified as ‘of
interest’ to the post-September-11th investigation.”
Compl. ¶ at 52.
It also supports the related
contention that Respondent’s assignment to the
ADMAX SHU was based on race, religion, or
national origin. It also supports the Second Circuit’s
years since 9/11, they have been inundated by frivolous
lawsuits filed by individuals alleging discrimination in the
aftermath of the attacks, or that district courts were unable to
manage discovery in post-9/11 discrimination cases against
high-level government officials.
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determination that “it is plausible to believe that
[Petitioners] would be aware of policies concerning
the detention of those arrested by federal officers in
the New York City area in the aftermath of 9/11 and
would know about, condone, or otherwise have
personal involvement in the implementation of those
policies.” 490 F.3d at 166. Indeed, Petitioners would
have us believe that they – who were charged with
leading the law enforcement and intelligence
communities’ response to the attacks – did not
affirmatively approve, condone, or know of, the
detention of hundreds of individuals in a federal
facility in New York created specifically after 9/11, a
facility that was only one of two that were the
subject of the OIG Report.
This cannot be squared away, however, with
the OIG Report, see OIG Report at 157 (“the security
risk posed by individual September 11 detainees or
their potential connections to terrorism” were
decisions “made by the FBI in consultation with the
U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of
New York and were communicated to the INS.”), a
brief from two former high-level FBI officers, see
Resp. Rolince, et al., Br. at 26 (“FBI Supervisors”
designated individuals as persons of “high interest”),
the Second Circuit’s ruling, see 490 F.3d at 166 (it is
plausible that Petitioners “would be aware of policies
concerning the detention of those arrested by federal
officers in the New York City area in the aftermath
of 9/11 and would know about, condone, or otherwise
have personal involvement in the implementation of
those policies.”); id. at 175-66 (commenting on the
“likelihood that [Petitioners] would have concerned
themselves with the formulation and implementation
of policies dealing with the confinement of those
arrested on federal charges in the New York City
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area and designated ‘of high interest’ in the
aftermath of 9/11.”), or the district court’s opinion,
see Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *20 (“the
post-September 11 context provides support for
plaintiffs’ assertions that defendants were involved
in creating and/or implementing the detention policy
under which plaintiffs were confined[.]”).
Amici contend that the post-9/11 context,
taken as a whole, supports the Second Circuit’s
conclusions with respect to Petitioners’ personal
knowledge of the discriminatory conduct taken
against Respondent Iqbal.
*

*

*

Respondent
Iqbal’s
allegations
of
discrimination on the basis of his race, religion, and
national origin, accepted as true, are plausible.
Amici urge the Court to grant Respondent the
modest relief he seeks – to move beyond the
pleadings stage and be given an opportunity to prove
that he has sufficient facts to support his claims.
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CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals’ judgment with respect
to claims of discrimination should be affirmed.
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